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[ ] 10, 012-62  
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5 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Briefing of Lt. General W. H. Blanchard,  
USAF

1. I have invited Lt. General W. H. Blanchard, the Inspector General of the Air Force, over for a briefing on OSA activities in general and the OXCART program in particular at 1000 hours on 7 December.

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2. Originally, General Blanchard was to get a briefing at [ ] on the 28th of November during his visit there. However, he had to depart on an emergency call and indicated his keen disappointment to [ ] at having to leave. General Blanchard has been a personal friend of mine for twenty years, and I believe that periodic briefings for him would be advantageous for both the Agency and the Air Force, and also continue a personal contact between myself and a high-ranking member of the Air Staff.

3. Dr. Scoville has been notified and concurs. General Blanchard has been cleared for all of our programs for some time.

4. I will assume your concurrence unless otherwise notified.

JACK C. LEDFORD  
COLONEL, USAF  
Assistant Director  
(Special Activities)

cc: DD/R

AD/OSA:JCL:jr

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1962

Illustrations of  
Policy Restraints on the Collection  
of Information through  
Overflight of Denied Areas  
during 1962

Satellite

1. There has been no policy restraint which has interfered with the collection of photography by CORONA.

U-2


2. Cuba. The interplay of various factors bearing upon the recent overflight of Cuba is currently being subjected to substantive analysis and any comment short of that study would necessarily be incomplete.

3. China. (For background it should be noted that the TACKLE program was initiated during the previous administration and was deployed the last months before the entry of the present administration. The year of 1961 witnessed at least a dozen major efforts to secure permission to actually overfly China with the TACKLE asset. It was not until January 1962 that the first approval for overflight was granted.)

4. TACKLE flights were stood down briefly during the visit of Mr. Robert Kennedy to the Far East. U-2s were also grounded as a result of the Sakhalin Island incident and the loss of the U-2 in

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China. It is doubted that these brief standdowns have resulted in serious substantive consequence.



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6. Kamchatka. A proposal for the overflight of Kamchatka in connection with the search of ABM facilities was postponed by the United States Intelligence Board in February 1962 pending the results of the SAC U-2 peripheral missions. Subsequently Kamchatka was programmed for COMCONA coverage, not only to satisfy U. S. major intelligence objectives, but also to determine for U-2 operational reasons whether surface-to-air missiles existed there. It may be assumed that the estimate of the political consequences of an accident over Kamchatka, or even the fact of overflight itself, were of such magnitude that it was a restraint on proposing overflight. In addition the interpretation placed on the President's statement concerning the overflight of the USSR has been construed as a restraint of policy.

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Summary

8. In the last year it is doubtful that policy restraints have seriously impaired U.S. collection of critical information through overflight except possibly in the special case of the USSR. In that instance, however, the USIB itself did not evaluate the requirement for information to be sufficiently critical to warrant the proposal that policy considerations be overridden. CORONA has ameliorated this need by making available extensive gross intelligence on the USSR. However, CORONA has not produced technical intelligence (of U-2 quality) on intercontinental ballistic missile, medium range ballistic missile, and antimissile ballistic missile installations which is still critical.

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The above per JQReber

Approved:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Deputy Director (Research) per JQReber

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